ORGANISATION FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION
Laying the foundation for state building, repatriation and law post-conflict
Phase Two of the Peace Plan between Israel and Palestine: accounting for key stakeholders and chartering the course for developing the law post-conflict
The recent rhetoric surrounding the ongoing negotiations for a second phase of a peace deal between Israel and Palestine has steered towards the use of terms well-grounded in International law. These are terms such as "trusteeship" and "transitional authority". A trust, in simple terms, comprises of a trustee who is charged with the duty to act in the best interests of the trust beneficiaries and can be held accountable in law for any failure in the proper exercise of that duty.
Less familiar but similar terms echoing the idea of a trust is the use of the term "guarantor countries" in the press release issued by Hamas on 8 October 2025. Use of the ambiguous term "technocratic apolitical Palestinian committee" in the twenty-point peace plan, however, begins to reveal the potential cracks in holding together the key stakeholders to the conflict. Cradling these stakeholders in a malleable framework can correct the trajectory in which the international community can finally aim in order to propel the development of International law and give rise to the birth of the law post-conflict.
Territorial administration is an example of a successful post-conflict reconstruction framework that has been previously spearheaded by the United Nations. Acting as the transitional authority, the United Nations has undertaken administrative obligations which could be described as duties in the paradigm of a trust. This makes the United Nations a viable trustee with the host state being the underlying beneficiary.
Territorial administration by the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor is an example where the United Nations was charged with the authority to administer the former colony of East Timor into a new state with a functional system of government. UNTAET's mandate, or duties, included maintaining law and order, developing civil and social services, running schools, banks and public utilities, providing humanitarian assistance and policing and establishing a fiscal authority and a civil service.
This then led to the United Nations Mission Support in East Timor, after the transitional government was established, which oversaw the duties for the provision of security and law enforcement, border patrol, public administration and asset handover. The final phase was the United Nations Office in Timor Leste which assisted in the development of state institutions and police, training and the observance of democratic governance and human rights.
These activities or obligations carried out by the United Nations under the enterprise of territorial administration are effectively examples of trust duties. The United Nations is therefore a key trustee in the context of a transitional authority charged with the duty to administer a territory.
Further, the United Nations has a plethora of sub-agencies such as United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, World Food Programme, United Nations Children's Fund, United Nations Development Programme and civilian police, amongst others, which it can leverage speedily in mobilising the constituent elements required for the gradual transition towards governance.
Equally paramount in the trust paradigm is the identification of the key beneficiaries or stakeholders whose purpose the trust seeks to serve. Accounting for de facto authorities in negotiations in territories transitioning from conflict is not without precedent. The territorial administration by the United Nations in Cambodia involved working with, amongst others, the Khmer Rouge who were responsible for genocide. Successful transitions toward post-conflict reconstruction involving de facto authorities have been witnessed from Afghanistan and Syria to Colombia. These examples show that these groups cannot always be side lined.
Should it heed the call for de-militarisation, Hamas and its representation together with that of the Palestinian Authority in the context of trusteeship in Palestine could possibly be accounted for as "co-trustees" together with the United Nations, the International Stabilisation Unit and the Board of Peace, or simply as "beneficiaries" of the trust.
In this way not only are the key stakeholders to the conflict accounted for but they are also empowered to hold the transitional authority to account in the exercise of its duties to the territory being administered. So far, the proposed “technocratic apolitical Palestinian committee” as a transitional authority is undefined and therefore void of any effective representation, accountability and enforcement mechanism. Furthermore, the proposed application of Israeli law to the West Bank raises questions concerning accountability and suggests a move towards a transitional phase that may not be representative of and accountable to the Palestinian people.
The United Nations has the legal, technical, institutional and practical expertise in the field of international territorial administration and the benefit of this experience should be brought on board.
The international community is presently at the juncture of a unique opportunity to establish a new area of International law, the law post-conflict. It is also an opportunity to revive the principle of trusteeship in International law and reframe its application in the context of contemporary conflict management from its prior and obsolete application in the context of decolonisation.
If conditions prevail, as they presently do in the case of Israel and Palestine, then a transitional authority which includes the United Nations as trustee and which is inclusive of all key stakeholders as co-trustees or beneficiaries will establish a malleable, representative and accountable framework for future conflict management and post-conflict reconstruction.